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Abstract: This article examines embodied visual meaning in film, the ways
that film makes use of recurring dynamic patterns of our shared bodily inter-
actions with the world (image schemas) to communicate abstract meaning
to the viewer. Following the lead of recent discoveries in the field of neuro-
science, the article argues that this metaphorical transference of abstract
thought by means of image schemas is possible via the activation of embod-
ied mirroring mechanisms in the observer. This empathetic and physical en-
counter of the viewer with the representational content and form of the work
is crucial to the understanding of abstract conceptual thought in film.
Keywords: aesthetic experience, conceptual metaphor, embodied mind, em-
bodied aesthetics, filmic metaphor, image schemas, mirror neurons
In the perception of shape lies the 
beginnings of concept formation.
—Rudolf Arnheim (1969)
Proponents of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) claim that knowledge of
abstract phenomena is only possible by linking these to concrete experiences.
The conceptual metaphor mind is body is at the core of this theory (Lakoff and
Johnson 1999).1 According to Lakoff and Johnson, thought is fundamentally
embodied, that is human beings use physical experiences to metaphorically
structure thoughts about abstract phenomena. For example, we speak about
time in terms of space (“the deadline is ahead of us,” “time flies by,” “we are
nearing the end of the year”) or we describe emotions in terms of forces (“she
fought against her tears,” “he suppressed his fears”). In order to further em-
phasize their claim of an “embodied mind,” both Johnson (1987) and Lakoff
(1987) point to image schemas. These recurring patterns of our sensomotoric
experiences (for example in-out, front-behind, and part-whole) play a crucial
role in answering the following question: How is abstract, philosophical
thinking possible? Conceptual metaphor theory needs to address the follow-
ing problem: the existence of image schemas is based nearly exclusively on
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verbal manifestations (see also Forceville 2011). To ascertain the veracity of the
claim that human beings use image schemas to make the world around them
comprehensible, it is therefore of pivotal importance to take non-verbal
modalities into account as well (see also Johnson 2007). This article aims to
contribute to this debate by appreciating the significant role of the body in
film. After introductory remarks concerning image schemas, the article shows
how they are used by filmmakers and their collaborators to convey abstract
meaning to the viewer. The article concludes with a discussion of the role of
image schemas in the viewer’s aesthetic experience.
Image Schemas: An Introduction
Although the term image schema is in itself no novelty, continuing on the
ideas of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961)
among others, it first appeared simultaneously in The Body in the Mind (John-
son 1987) and in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (Lakoff 1987).2 Johnson
describes the image schema as follows:
An image schema is a recurring dynamic pattern of our perceptual in-
teractions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to
our experience. . . . Experience is to be understood in a very rich, broad
sense as including basic perceptual, motor-program, emotional, histori-
cal, social and linguistic dimensions. (1987: xic, xvi)
Let us illustrate this by using a schema that Johnson (1993: 166) considered to
be of fundamental importance to our thinking: the source-path-goal schema
or SPG. While swimming, running, walking, or moving in any other way, a cer-
tain structure or pattern emerges as a person moves from an initial condition
A (source) over a pathway C (path) toward a destination B (goal). This is what
Johnson calls an image schema. The schema is abstract in nature because it
needs to be general and applicable to a wide range of experiences. Alterna-
tively, it is also concrete because it is grounded in our daily physical interac-
tions with the world. In his reading of Lakoff and Johnson, Hampe (2005: 1)
summarizes the main characteristics of an image schema as follows:
• Images schemas are directly meaningful, preconceptual structures
grounded in our physical movements through space and in our percep-
tual and physical interactions with objects.
• Image schemas are highly schematic gestalts, conveying the structural
contours of our sensomotoric experiences in a general way. Because of
their abstract and unspecified nature, image schemas are never just
physical. There is always a mental aspect involved.
• Image schemas exist as recurring and analogous patterns beneath the
level of conscious awareness and prior to theoretical and conceptual re-
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flection.3 They come to being automatically and prereflectivily in our
daily physical interaction with the world.
• Being gestalts, they are internally structured (i.e., they are composed of
very few related parts) and they are very flexible. Because of this flexibil-
ity, a single image schema can manifest itself in multiple domains. For
example, a part of the body may not have anything to do with a part of
a theory, but both share a joint organisational structure. As such, simi-
larities can be discerned between concepts that may seem vastly differ-
ent at first sight.
Other examples mentioned by Johnson (1987, 2005) include the image
schemas in-out, center-periphery, close-far, front-back, and so on. What these
often self-evident image schemas have in common is their basis in a shared
physical experience. This uniformity grants image schemas a certain objectiv-
ity, which protects them from sheer subjectivity and relativism.
Johnson (1987, 2005, 2007) argues that the structure of these shared phys-
ical experiences forms the base for rational and abstract thought. More pre-
cisely, image schemas can be extended metaphorically to the realm of
abstract phenomena. Johnson (2005: 24) writes: “The central idea is that im-
age schemas, which arise recurrently in our perception and bodily movement,
have their own logic, which can be applied to abstract conceptual domains.
Image-schematic logic then serves as the basis for inferences about abstract
domains.” To illustrate this point, he refers to the schema of balance, which is
often used to structure a rational argument (Johnson 1987: 89): “When I set
out to convince others of my view, I pile up evidence, amass facts, and build up
a weighty argument. Ideally, anyone who listens to my argument will weigh its
merits. Two arguments may carry equal weight, so we then try to tip the scale
in favor of our view by adding further evidence. If we are successful, we feel
the balance tip in our favour, as we add to our argument.” As such, the balance
image schema allows one to understand the abstract in terms of the concrete.
The conceptual metaphor theory is, however, lim-
ited in a key way. As Forceville (2009, 2011) rightly
points out, most studies are based solely on verbal
manifestations of conceptual metaphors. If Lakoff
and Johnson are indeed correct in claiming that the
body plays a fundamental part in conceptualizing ab-
stract phenomena through its mediating role, it is
plausible to assume that non-verbal manifestations
of conceptual metaphors exist as the metaphoric be-
longs to the realm of thoughts and not of words.
Language only covers one modality that conveys
the physical and metaphorical interconnections of
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our thinking. If body and mind are interwoven, this connection should be vis-
ible through other modalities as well. Language is not the only bearer of em-
bodied meaning (see also Johnson 2007: 207–234). As the focus is left on the
verbal, there is a risk of engaging in circular reasoning where the existence of
image schemas is only proven on the basis of spoken and written words. Crit-
ics of the conceptual metaphor theory might posit the counterargument that
the conceptual domain and that of language are fundamentally the same,
which would severely undermine the credibility of CMT. To respond to these
objections, it is of pivotal importance that non-verbal expressions are brought
into account. This in turn motivated Charles Forceville (2009, 2011) to confront
CMT claims by considering them in the light of multimodal and non-verbal
manifestations of conceptual metaphor.
Following Forceville, we hereby attempt to contribute to this debate by ap-
preciating the significant role of the body in film. More precisely, an analysis
of specific film images allows us to illustrate how filmmakers and their collab-
orators make use of image schemas to convey abstract meaning to the viewer.
Image Schemas in Film
In the second chapter of his book The Cognitive Semiotics of Film, Warren Buck-
land (2000) pleads for a renewed appreciation of the corporeal dimension
within film theory. Backed by insights acquired by Lakoff and Johnson and
their notion of image schemas, he makes it his goal to vanquish what he con-
siders symptomatic in cognitive and psychoanalytical reflections on film: the
neglect of the body. Buckland engages in a discussion with David Bordwell,
among others. Like Lakoff and Johnson, Bordwell has developed a theory
based on schemas. However, whereas the conceptual metaphor theory uses a
definition that is intrinsically dynamic and connected to the body, Bordwell,
according to Buckland (2000: 31–32), offers a view of schemas that is abstract,
disembodied, transcendent, and static.
In his book Narration in the Fiction Film David Bordwell (1985) typifies the
narrative film as inherently incomplete. More specifically, he posits that the
logical form is incomplete, but that this gap is filled by the active mental in-
tervention of the viewer. To illustrate this position, he refers to the narratolog-
ical distinction between fabula and syuzhet, drawn from Russian Formalism
(see, e.g., Tomashevsky 1965). The fabula or story not only describes all visible
and audible events, it also conveys all events that are assumed by the viewer,
in chronological and causal order. Conversely, the syuzhet or plot consists of
the visible and audible events that occur during the film as seen and heard by
the viewer. In order to reconstruct the fabula—the narrative logic of the
film—Bordwell believes that the viewer uses specific schemas. These are ab-
stract mental structures that organize the perceptual cues in the plot into a
coherent and comprehensible mental whole. One of the most important
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schemas is that of cause-and-effect, a schema allowing the viewer to causally
link the events of a film.
For Buckland this view strongly exemplifies a top-down approach. Bord-
well conceives schemas as abstract conceptual structures (top) that relate to
the perceptual chaos (bottom) of what the film shows or makes audible. As
such, Buckland (2000: 31) argues, he isolates the physical grounding of
schemas and describes their function merely in terms of the creation of literal
meaning, leaving no room for metaphors. As he puts it: “Bordwell’s cogni-
tivism follows the philosophy of the subject in that both involve disembodi-
ment and the subject’s isolation from language” (Buckland 2000: 32).
Although Buckland certainly makes a point in addressing the bodily roots
of schemas, his criticism of Bordwell seems somewhat strong for the follow-
ing reasons.
First, Bordwell is said to have developed a strong disembodied theory of
schemata. In light of more recent claims this objection seems somewhat
unjustified and outdated. In Poetics of Cinema (2008), for example, Bordwell
discusses the relationship of bottom-up to top-down processes, and acknowl-
edges the possible embodiment of “higher-order” activities:
The top-down-bottom-up distinction drastically simplifies a complex
process that would probably be best modelled along several dimensions
rather than a single vertical one. . . . Psychological research in the cogni-
tive paradigm has steadily diminished claims for a blank-slate concep-
tion of the human mind and belief in the unlimited plasticity of human
capacities. More and more activities seem traceable to humans’ super-
sensitive natural endowment. . . . As research goes on, many “higher-
order” activities will probably be revealed as grounded in a rich percep-
tual system present at birth but awaiting activation and tuning from
the environment. (Bordwell 2008: 45)
Second, by rejecting Bordwell’s account of abstract schemas and substi-
tuting it with Johnson’s embodied concept of image schemas, Buckland treats
both schemas at the same level, thus making abstraction of the functional
and hierarchical discrepancy between the two. Gallese and Lakoff (2005) and
Dodge and Lakoff (2005), for example, refer to image schemas such as SPG
and containment as “primitive,” suggesting that other schemas might be
more complex, less clearly tied to the body. A more reasonable account would
be then to argue that simpler bodily schemas such as SPG are used to struc-
ture complex schematic structures such as causation. Indeed, if our under-
standing of abstract thought is structured in terms of our perceiving and
doing, as Johnson (2005: 16) argues, then the same bodily structures must be
appropriated to shape our understanding of abstract schemas such as cause-
and-effect as well. Hence, if image schemas are metaphorically recruited to
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understand abstract schemas (for a discussion of causation,
see, e.g., Johnson 2008), then the former cannot act as a substi-
tute for the latter.
Furthermore, Buckland seems to suggest that all schemas
and all metaphors derive from the body and not from the world
outside of our bodies. Adopting this perspective neglects, how-
ever, the importance of culture (Kövecses 2005; Yu 1998,) and
history (Blumenberg 1998) in characterizing metaphor and
schemas. As Westra (2010: 128) argues by referring to Blumenberg’s meta-
phorology, we should avoid the temptation to reduce all metaphor to the
sphere of embodiment: “Both approaches (embodiment and the cultural/his-
torical dimension) can, and even should be, viewed as complementary for an
overall theory of metaphor.”
In this article we propose, then, to adopt a moderate view of image
schemas. Rather than rejecting Bordwell’s theory, we argue that both views
can be complimentary. Image schema theory does not have to rule out a more
abstract account of schemas. Following Buckland (2000), although not in an
absolute way, and some other recent studies (Branigan 2003, 2006; Forceville
2011; Forceville and Jeulink 2011; Kappelhoff and Müller 2011) we plead for a re-
newed appreciation of the body by considering Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of
image schemas in the light of the filmic medium. Whereas Buckland (2000:
46–51) tries to determine how a specific schema can be applied to general
concepts from film theory such as frame or diegesis, we opt to illustrate the
process of embodied meaning by showing some of the ways in which image
schemas operate in significant film scenes. In what follows we describe five
image schemas in film, and we show how they determine
the structure of abstract conceptual thought. In discussing
each image schema, we sometimes refer to linguistic ex-
amples. This, however, does not imply that linguistic
metaphors are needed for the viewer in order to grasp the
meaning of the scene in question. By bringing them in, we
only want to draw attention to CMT’s claim that metaphor
is primarily conceptual, a matter of thought. Therefore, the same image
schema can operate in film as well as in language. Both media are manifesta-
tions of one and the same conceptual metaphor.
Container This schema is essential to our physical experience and is charac-
terized by the attributes inside, border, and outside. Concerning the
metaphorical application, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 30) note that the visual
field is generally perceived as a container, as things appear in and out of view
(“there is nothing in view,” “she is out of sight,” “I can’t see him because that
tree is in the way”). A complex filmic application of this image schema is of-
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fered by a scene from Spartacus (1960). The film shows Julius Caesar (John
Gavin) in a Roman bath while he is conversing with patrician and strategist
Marcus Licinius Crassus (Laurence Olivier). The men are opposite each other
and depicted without interference of cutting. Crassus fills the left side of the
filmic space, Caesar the right. Crassus has decided to manipulate Caesar in or-
der to get rid of his political opponent in the Senate, the hedonist Sempronius
Gracchus (Charles Laughton). When later on Gracchus joins the conversation,
the mise-en-scène is adjusted. Caesar moves toward the neutral center of the
screen, flanked by the two sides between which he will have to choose (Fig-
ure 1). Then Crassus leaves the scene, emptying the filmic space he was occu-
pying. Caesar then rises and puts himself opposite Gracchus, thus occupying
the same space (or container) that was inhabited by Crassus (Figure 2). Where
his position had been neutral before, he has now chosen a side. This change
in the state of affairs is confirmed by a play with shot-reverse shots. Both 
men no longer fill the same filmic space (container). As such, the concrete (in
this case our shared physical experience of in and out) is metaphorically 
extended and used to express the abstract political machinations of the cor-
rupt Roman aristocrats. In other words, the image schema of a container func-
tions as a solution to the problem of how to express political power struggles
cinematically.4
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SOURCE-PATH-GOAL In their study on the SPG schema in animation, Forceville
and Jeulink (2011) show how this image schema plays a crucial role in concep-
tualizing time. In the short animation film O (1996), for example, the SPG
schema is instantiated by movement from right (past, birth) to left (future,
death), thus spatially suggesting the protagonist’s maturing and ageing. But
live action films make use of this schema as well. In a scene from Professione:
Reporter (1975), the images betray the use of the SPG schema to solve the
filmic problem of a flashback. When foreign correspondent David Locke (Jack
Nicholson) switches his identity for deceased weapons dealer Robertson’s
(Charles Mulvehill), the film goes back in time to a conversation between the
two men. This flashback occurs as follows: the camera moves uninterruptedly
in a horizontal way from an initial condition A (the present: Locke at the table
while he trades his passport photo for Robertson’s) over a pathway C to desti-
nation B (the past: both men talking on the veranda) and then returns from B
(the past) to A (the present). As the movement takes place horizontally, the
schema left-right is part of the metaphoric conveyance. The left side of the
room is temporally one with the past, the right corresponds to the present.
Movement into the depth of the screen would turn the schema into front-be-
hind. Think, for example, of the opening scene from Murder, My Sweet (1944).
As this time-moving metaphor (see also Gentner and Imai 1992; Lakoff and
Johnson [1980] 2003) depends on a filmic parameter (in this case: the move-
ment of the camera), it can be called a filmic metaphor, following Rohdin
(2009).
Center-Periphery This image schema finds its physical roots in the experience
of the body as center and in that of the perceptual field as periphery. It can be
described briefly as follows: a perceived object gains intensity as it approaches
the center (see also Deane 1995: 633). The shorter the distance to the center,
the greater the potential for interaction and intimacy, and vice versa. In the
American war film Casualties of War (1989), dealing with the abduction and
rape of a Vietnamese teenage girl by four American soldiers, this image
schema is used to metaphorically emphasize Sgt Meserve’s (Sean Penn) dom-
inant position within his group of soldiers. The film shows a static shot of Sgt
Meserve in the foreground while he is shaving. His four subjects are in the
background. The image is constructed symmetrically, visually accentuating
the vertical axis in the middle. This separation is given emphasis in the ante-
filmic space by the presence of a hanging blanket in the middle of the screen,
separating the two entities. Sgt Meserve is standing to the right of the blan-
ket while the soldiers can be seen to its left. The information within this frame
is more or less constant. Neither the camera nor the characters move in any
way that calls attention to itself, keeping the structure of the image stable.
The shot makes use of the split-focus technique (keeping the foreground and
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the background into focus at the same time), suggesting that the film delib-
erately chooses to keep as short a distance as possible between Sgt Meserve
and the camera. As the leader of the group, he is centralized, while his soldiers
remain in the periphery. Because of this, he gains intensity and his dominant
position is suggested to the viewer. As such, the positional terms front and
back are laden with abstract meaning in this context. On top of that, the ser-
geant is shown to the right of the screen, not the left. As the viewer’s gaze
seems to be drawn to the right when reading an image in a static frame, the
character in the right of the frame is always given more attention than the
scene in the left (Gross and Bomstein 1978). This discovery from perceptual
psychology is used metaphorically to motivate Sgt Meserve’s position within
the frame.
Verticality The schema vertically or high-low/top-down finds its physical roots
in numerous experiences. As a rule, people tend to lie down while sleeping
and get up when waking up. Happiness and sadness are often metaphorically
understood in terms of this schema (“I fell into a depression,” “the morale
sank,” “my joy was rising”). Control and submission are also articulated through
this schema. Earlier we discussed how the image schema center-periphery
served to answer the psychological (and as such, abstract) control exercised by
Sgt Meserve in Casualties of War. Another scene from the same film shows
how the vertically image schema can play the same role as a possible filmic al-
ternative. In one shot, the film shows Sgt Meserve in worm’s-eye view (low
angle) while the object of his gaze (the soldiers) is filmed in bird’s-eye view
(high angle). The effect of this subjective style of shooting is that of Sgt Me-
serve looking down on his subjects like a divine figure. The spatial terms low
and high receive the connotations of submission and control, respectively. This
way, the film evokes the conceptual metaphor control is high, being submitted
to control is low (see also Lakoff and Johnson [1980] 2003: 15). In this example,
we are dealing with a filmic metaphor where the camera angle is responsible
for evoking the conceptual metaphor in the viewer. Besides the angle, film-
makers could choose to make use of the antefilmic space as well. For example,
American director Joseph Losey is known to use the vertical dynamic of the
stairs metaphorically in order to represent the dialectic between master and
slave and the corresponding relationship of the domineering and the submis-
sive (examples can be seen in The Servant [1963] and Accident [1967]).
Balance Finally, the balance image schema finds its roots in the physical ex-
perience of the symmetrical distribution of gravitational forces relating to a
central axis, such as the balance exercised by a rope dancer. In his book The
Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason, Mark
Johnson (1987) describes how the physical experience of balance metaphori-
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cally relates to the visual content of art. This image schema would explain
why the perception of symmetry is often experienced as pleasant, as the con-
tent of the art seems to metaphorically imitate the physical experience of bal-
ance and symmetry.
However, the image schema can also be used to express oppositions on a
higher and more abstract level. An example of this can be found in You Only
Live Once (1937). In this fatalistic drama of doom directed by Fritz Lang, Henry
Fonda plays ex-convict Eddie Taylor who cannot seem to find a steady job in
the outside world. He marries Joan Graham (Sylvia Sidney) and the couple has
a child. When Taylor is wrongfully accused of murder, he runs away. In his at-
tempt to escape from the police, Taylor ultimately commits an actual murder,
which leads to a grim and untimely death for himself and his beloved. In or-
der to express a dying faith in modern society (represented in the film by in-
stitutions such as the Church, the judicial system and prison), on the one
hand, and the unity of love, on the other, the film makes clever use of the bal-
ance image schema. The first part of the film has the camera showing Taylor
in the presence of his priest and his attorney. He is allowed to leave prison. The
three characters walk toward the exit of the prison, which serves as a gateway
to his beloved. The walking action is filmed with a lateral traveling shot, fol-
lowing the characters toward the exit. The scene is filmed in a striking way.
The camera bobs up and down, partially cutting off Fonda’s face in the top
edge of the screen (Figure 3). When the metal gate is opened, the situation
changes. Another traveling movement is used, this time a very pure and pre-
cise movement straight toward Joan (Figure 4). This way the film restores a
sense of security to the images that was lacking before. When Eddie sees Joan,
balance is returned. She gives him the certainty that he is moving in the right
direction. The deliberately erratic movements of the image, inside and out-
side, represented his sense of unease and the possibility of things going
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wrong again, an omen of the doom that awaits later in the film. It is also
worth noting that the couple is shown in the center of the screen when they
are renewed. The only source of security is not the Church or the judicial sys-
tem, but love. This idea is communicated metaphorically using the image
schema of balance.5
Image Schemas and the Viewer: On Mirror Neurons 
and Aesthetic Experience
So far we have restricted ourselves to a discussion concerning image schemas
on the level of specific filmic images. Now the following question arises: how
do these image schemas relate to the viewer? How is the (physical) viewer re-
lated, for example, to the (embodied) SPG schema from Professione: Reporter?
This question is crucial because the film maker has the intention to transfer
abstract content. This primarily requires the viewer to relate to the embodied
aspects of the image schemas on screen—whether this occurs consciously or
not. The body functions as a conduit for abstract conceptual thought. With-
out this conformity between object and subject, no transference can take
place.
The recent discovery of “mirror neurons” within the domain of neuro-
science (Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996) offers a possible answer to
the question of how this bridge can be made. These neurons, considered by
some to be one of the most important discoveries in modern brain science,
are spread over crucial parts of our brain: the premotor cortex and posterior
parietal cortex. The remarkable quality of the mirror neuron system (MNS) is
that it not only activates when we perform a certain action, but also when we
see another person performing that same action. When the MNS is activated,
the observation of an action triggers the same neural networks that are active
during its execution (Freedberg and Gallese 2007: 200). They are called mirror
neurons because the visual characteristics of the neurons (the visual stimuli
activating the neurons during the passive act of watching) reflect the motoric
activity (the motoric actions neurons activate when performing the action in
question). The discovery of this mechanism suggests that, when we see an-
other person performing an action, we are mentally performing the same ac-
tion. In short, this means that each action we witness, we repeat in our minds,
whether it is Buster Keaton’s acrobatics or the ambiguous smile on Liv Ull-
mann’s face in Ingmar Bergman’s Persona (1966). On a more fundamental
level, this means that there is probably a biological dynamic that supports our
understanding of others and the complex exchange of abstract ideas.
Recognizing the implications of the discovery of mirroring mechanisms for
our understanding of art, Freedberg and Gallese (2007) and Gallese (2010,
2011) have been among the first to apply this model from neuroscience to aes-
thetic experience. In their study, they describe the aesthetic experience as pri-
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marily a physical encounter of the viewer with the artwork where the work—
whether it be a static work such as a building or a painting, or moving art such
as film or dance—activates all kinds of mechanisms in the viewer including
the simulation of actions, emotions, and tactile sensations. This discovery of a
physical relation between object and subject as a basis for aesthetic experi-
ence is not new. In 1873 Robert Vischer (1994) already introduced the concept
of empathy or Einfühlung in the domain of aesthetics. Vischer described Ein-
fühlung as the physical response caused by the form within a painting.6 Ac-
cording to him, symbolic shapes get their meanings primarily from their
embodied and anthropomorphic content. What is new in Freedberg and
Gallese is the connection of this notion of empathy to mirror neurons. As
such, they bring the discussion on the aesthetic role of empathy from a meta-
physical and intuitive level to a material and physical level (the definable
structure of the body and the brain). Mirror neurons therefore form an empir-
ical and objective basis for the role of empathy and emotion in the aesthetic
experience of the viewer. Suddenly, empathy is given a more important role
than it has traditionally been endowed by art historians such as E. H. Gom-
brich (1960) and R. H. Collingwood (1938) whose focus was on the cognitive as-
pects of art. As such, the concepts of empathy and emotion are freed from
their position of isolation and neglect.
Freedberg and Gallese’s (2007) theory on empathy is expressed through
two complementary aspects of relations. First, there is the “relation between
embodied empathetic feelings in the observer and the representational con-
tent of the works in terms of the actions, intentions, objects, emotions and
sensations depicted in a given painting or sculpture” (ibid.: 199). This aspect
can be described as the what of the aesthetic experience. Second, there is the
“relation between embodied, empathetic feelings in the observer and the
quality of the work in terms of the visible traces of the artist’s creative ges-
tures, such as vigorous modelling in clay or paint, fast brushwork and signs of
the movement of the hand more generally” (ibid.). This aspect is the how of
the aesthetic experience and refers more generally to the form of the artwork.
In this case the sense of the felt bodily response arises not from any seen ac-
tions, but from the implied movement of the artist. Think for example of the
grandiose strokes of Peter Paul Rubens or of Jackson Pollock’s action painting.
Although Freedberg and Gallese mostly focus on painting, film can be recog-
nized to share these two sources of aesthetic experience. On the one hand,
physical experiences can be evoked in the viewer by events and ac-
tions on the antefilmic level, that what is being depicted in front of
the camera.
On the other hand, the embodied mechanisms can be activated in
the viewer by events on the filmic level. It is mainly in this category
that the examples discussed above can be categorized. Think of Pro-
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fessione: Reporter, for example, where a horizontal camera movement, as a
filmic parameter, evokes the embodied SPG image schema. Schematically,
Freedberg and Gallese’s theory can be represented as the following dualistic
model of aesthetic experience (Figure 5):
Figure 5. Dualistic model of aesthetic experience
Freedberg and Gallese’s theory is, however, limited in one important way.
Challenging the primacy of cognition in responses to art, Gallese and Freed-
berg define aesthetic experience almost exclusively in terms of a physical re-
lation. Little attention is given to the abstract and cognitive dimension of
aesthetic experience. Their dualistic approach mostly focuses on the physical
connectivity between the work and the viewer, while in fact this physical rela-
tion could in turn form a bridge to the construction of meaning on a higher,
more conceptual level. For example, in Professione: Reporter, the aesthetic feel-
ings are not limited to a physical relation between the viewer and the work
(based on the SPG schema). The conformity between the form of the film, on
the one hand, and the subject’s body, on the other hand, constitutes an open-
ing to the conveyance of abstract meaning (the exposition over time) where
the body functions as the source domain for the metaphoric clarification of
the abstract target domain. The image schema that is expressed in the form
(a camera movement, a concrete expression of the
work) and that metaphorically refers to the con-
crete repertoire of the viewer’s experiences (physi-
cal actions such as swimming or walking), is then
again applied metaphorically in order to convey an
abstract phenomenon. In other words, the aesthetic
experience that is the result of a physical intertwin-
ing of the subject and the object (as seen in Freed-
berg and Gallese) can trigger a further cognitive
application of the aesthetic experience. Note that
this opening to a deeper, conceptual level is entirely
determined by the body. The abstract content can-
not be formed without the physical mediation be-
tween object and subject. Through the image schema, the abstract always
refers to the physical, so that the former cannot be seen separately from the
latter. The cognitive aspect of the aesthetic experience always implies a sen-
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sory aspect. Taking these observations into account, Freedberg and Gallese’s
dualistic model can be extended to a three-part model (see Figure 6):
Figure 6. Three-part model of aesthetic experience
Conclusion
In his 1873 essay “Über das optische Formgefühl: Ein Beträg zur Ästhetik,”
Robert Vischer distinguishes between Sehen and Schauen. The former he de-
scribes as the mere passive and unconscious experience of physiological stim-
uli where the stimuli received have not yet been transformed and ordered into
a meaningful, living whole. It is the task of the process of Schauen to achieve
that transformation and order. Vischer typifies Schauen as follows:
Scanning (Schauen) is more conscious than mere seeing (Sehen), for it
sets out to analyze the forms dialectically (by separating and reconnect-
ing the elements) and to bring them into a mechanical relationship.
Scanning alone makes a complete artistic presentation possible, for its
movement . . . is accompanied by an impelling animation of the dead
phenomenon, a rhythmic enlivening and revitalization of it. . . . Once I
have accomplished the process of scanning, the impression of seeing is
repeated on a higher level. What I have seemingly separated I have re-
assembled into an ordered and restful unity. Again I have an enclosed,
complete image, but one developed and filled with emotion. To chaotic
“Being” I called “Become!” (1994: 94)
This article has focused on the second form of viewing. We have shown
how filmic images are anchored in bodily experience via image schemas. This
thesis is biologically and neurologically justified by the recent discovery of
mirror neurons, which may serve as an explanatory model for the empathic
exchanges between object and subject. The result of this process is a kind of
harmony between the viewer as a physical subject and the filmic images. Our
E M B O D I E D  V I S U A L  M E A N I N G  /  9 7
s6_PROJ_060206  9/27/12  10:19 AM  Page 97
analysis of specific filmic images has allowed us to conclude that this con-
formity between the two can be applied metaphorically to convey abstract
meaning. Embodied image schemas such as container, SPG schema, center-
periphery, , verticality, and balance are applied metaphorically in order to ex-
press abstract phenomena such as power struggles, psychological conditions,
and the movement of time. Therefore, our analysis allows us to appreciate
both the cognitive and the physical dimension of aesthetic experience. In this
way, our article offers a nuanced middle road between the purely cognitive
and the purely physical. Let us conclude by quoting Warren Buckland (2000:
51): “Perception is not a process that involves a relation between the eye and
the mind (whether conscious or unconscious); more fundamentally, it in-
volves the metaphorical projection of the body on screen and in frame.”
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Notes
1 In cognitive or conceptual metaphor theory it is common to use small capital letters to
indicate that these particular wordings are not a matter of language, but of concepts, be-
longing to the realm of human thought. These concepts are underlying the very nature of
our daily metaphorical expressions (linguistic or otherwise).
2 According to Kant ([1781/1787] 1999), the schema—which he described as “an art hid-
den in the depths of the human soul”—was the third instance allowing the application of
purely cognitive concepts (categories) on sensory experiences.
3 We refer to the distinction made by German philosopher Martin Heidegger between
Vorhandensein and Zuhandensein. The former marks the relation between man and thing as
a conscious and theoretical one. The latter has its meaning flowing forth from the way we
relate to all things in our daily existence.
4 For a similar reflection on this scene—albeit not from a metaphorical angle—see Gün-
ther (2004).
5 These reflections are partly inspired by the insights of French filmmaker Claude
Chabrol who analyzes a few scenes from the film in the short documentary Fritz Lang par
Claude Chabrol (2003), which can be viewed as an extra feature on the Region 2 DVD of You
Only Live Once (EAN: 5050582501704).
6 We refer to the observations on art theory made by Aby Warburg and Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty. See Rampley (1997) for a discussion by Aby Warburg relating to Robert Vischer.
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